Written by Julia Piórko Bermig

As we enter the second quarter of the century, what can we expect of the ever-shifting world order?
For one, the International Crisis Group predicts that geopolitical actors will be even more prone to resort to unilateral action as they see fewer constraints.
In keeping with the recent trajectory, 2025 will likely see a significant downturn in global democratic performance, with many nations facing incumbency backlash and weakened governance. Given that the world experiences a net decline in democratic performance (CIDOB), 2025 is likely to see a continuation of democratic volatility.
As Trump steps into office, major realignments of the international order are to be expected. His return to power, based on his cabinet selections and statements, will see a continuation of his largely realist, transactional approach and may see potential deals with Russia in regards to it’s invasion of Ukraine. A potential U.S.-China compromise may impact Russia’s war on Ukraine, through a Sino-Russian "axis of convenience" will continue to challenge the Western-led international order.
Anticipating the challenges a second Trump term implicates, China will likely rely on stimulus measures as it approaches its 15th five-year plan, which stipulates global economic engagement. The focus will largely need to be placed on managing tariff pressures from the incoming White House administration.
Despite continuing global economic fragmentation, AI innovations fuel hopes for connectivity. That noted, the rise of AI presents existential threats given its capacity to engage in large-scale cyberattacks, as well as its warfare and hybrid applications threaten to upheave infrastructure, social, financial, and economic systems, likely intensifying global instability. As such, the global push for AI governance and regulation is likely to continue to intensify. (Chatham House, ECFR).
Regions are likely to tackle their unique challenges, briefly outlined here:
Europe:
As NATO faces increasing pressure given likely waning U.S. support, European defensive strategies ought to (be pressured to) continue to evolve. Domestically, many European nations are grappling with the rise of populist and extremist parties, amid rising authoritarianism globally.
Middle East:
As Syria seeks to rebuild and carve out a fresh new post-Assad direction, observers will be keen to see how the new regime navigates a pending power vacuum in a state marred by structural weaknesses. Israel will continue to attempt to stack regional dynamics in its favor.
Africa:
As the CIDOB (Barcelona Center for International Affairs) notes, increasing fragmentation sees increasing cooperation by organized crime groups expanding their reach and threat. In Africa, militant groups will likely continue to threaten national sovereignty and destabilize the Sahel.
Major powers will continue to use the region as a proxy for their rivalries.
Asia:
As noted earlier, should Trump introduce tariffs on China, the region is likely to face a mass trade stress test. In the domestic political realm, Myanmar’s defacto leadership (XX) plans to host a general election this year may foreshadow the nation’s path - time will tell whether the regime can use this opportunity to legitimize themselves.
Latin America:
In Latin America, a wave of elections (similar to what we saw in 2024) is scheduled, including in Ecuador, Bolivia, Canada, Argentina, Honduras, and Chile. Assuming policy continuity, Trump’s second presidential term will be pivotal to the region’s development and political landscape, with acute implications for migration, trade, and security.
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