By Ishaan Patel
On September 21st, president Vladimir Putin announced the mobilisation of 300,000 Russian reservists in what was called a ‘partial mobilisation’.
In the speech, Putin made further escalatory claims, including warning the west against what he called ‘nuclear blackmail’, and swearing that if Russia's Territorial integrity was threatened, it would not hesitate to employ its nuclear weapons as an option.
Now, these troops seem like nothing more than an insurance policy. As of the writing of this article, Russia has been holding referendums in the occupied territories of Kherson, Luhansk, Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, which western countries have called illegal and invalid. Russia’s endgame is not to expand - even with greater manpower, it simply lacks the material capability to embark on a new offensive. Instead, Russia wants to hold these territories from Ukrainian attacks, with the crucial weakness amongst the Russian lines being the simple lack of manpower to hold these occupied territories. If the Russian forces can dig in and simply hold in the face of Ukrainian attacks, this would count as a victory.
But, of course, adding these new territories is not likely to stop Ukrainian counter-offensives. The Ukrainian government has made clear several times that its end goal is the complete liberation of the estimated ⅕ of the country that is under Russian control. And with the current status of the Russian mobilisation, it looks like any attempt to hold these provinces will be highly costly. First of all, the contracted soldiers who were sent in the first place were amongst the most well-equipped in the Russian army, professionals who served in the armed forces as a job. This isn’t saying much - the initial invasion was still extremely under-equipped, with technologies and weapons far beneath the western ones supplied to Ukraine. But the equipment that mobilised soldiers is getting, to say frankly, pathetic. It is becoming quite evident that the equipment given to these men was simply dug up from old soviet bunkers, with numerous battalions being given rusted AK-47s, crumbling bullets and being told to bring their sleeping bags and camping equipment, as well being instructed that in lieu of actual first-aid equipment, to use tampons and menstrual pads instead. But perhaps, the most disturbing fact to have come out from the mobilisation is the fact that Russia intends to give its men just 2 weeks in training - which, to fight a technologically advanced, tactically competent and spirited enemy, means that these reservists are just cannon fodder. In comparison, men who served in the Gulf War against a far inferior enemy were given whole months of military training.
Unfortunately, it’s not hyperbolic to say that many of these mobilised troops have been doomed from the start. There isn’t a viable scenario in which a majority of Russian troops come out unscathed and unaffected. And, with this loss of life will come discontent. Russians now have to contend with a brutal fact - instead of treating this war as a faraway foreign escapade, they will realise it to be what it is: a merciless meat grinder. Russians could ignore the death of contracted soldiers, people who chose war as a profession, but when sons, brothers and fathers come back in caskets, the true devastation of the war will be felt. You can endure economic hardship and political instability, but the loss of life reaches far deeper.
Furthermore, the mobilisation and illegal referenda spell further economic retaliation - against an economy that is frankly in the shitter. Major industries have fled from Russia, accompanied by a complete export collapse. Furthermore, an immense brain drain followed in the wake of the invasion as Russians in skilled areas such as tech and medicine have exited the country. And when European markets completely shut off from Russian gas for good, the real trouble starts. Products like gas are non-fungible, and the infrastructure required to supply will take years to construct - removing exportation in the short-term, where Russia has nothing to make up the difference. Russia’s economy and standard of living is likely to drop to levels not seen before and in extremely little time.
There is also the threat of nuclear retaliation. Many people suspect that the annexation of these territories means an assault on them could mean an attack on Russia itself, opening the use of tactical nukes in response to a threat on Russian territory. Now, a tactical nuke is a battlefield weapon - it has a smaller yield and is used against armies, not cities. But just because it is not ‘world-ending’ per say, does not mean that it would have significant consequences. There is an idea called the nuclear taboo - in which the detonation of any nuclear weapon lowers these standards of deterrence and increases the risk of all-consuming nuclear war. Every country is interested in ensuring they are not evaporated, to maintain this deterrence. A detonation of even a tactical nuke means that Russia is likely to be utterly isolated - a true pariah state. Even its ‘closest’ allies, such as China or India, would undoubtedly close relations with the country to pressure it to de-escalate. A tactical nuke is possible, but these threats are more likely to be sabre-rattling, as Putin gains much less from exploding a warhead in Ukraine.
What is clear from all this is that a true ‘war’ has the ability to bite its propagator as well. This escalation by Putin means that Russian society is on an accelerated trend of chaos and instability. The economic despair, the degradation of foreign relations, and the ultimate pain of a lost life, mean that the current regime is on a tightrope - trying desperately to advance to a clean conclusion.
F. Cancian, Mark. “What Does Russia’s “Partial Mobilization” Mean?” Www.csis.org, 26 Sept. 2022, www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-russias-partial-mobilization-mean.
Faulconbridge, Guy, and Jonathan Landay. “Russia Issues New Nuclear Warning as Contested Ukraine Referendums End.” Reuters, 27 Sept. 2022, www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-annexation-votes-end-amid-russian-mobilisation-exodus-2022-09-26/. Accessed 25 Oct. 2022.
Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2021: Rights Trends in Russia.” Human Rights Watch, 3 Dec. 2020, www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/russia.
Staff, Washington Post. “Read Putin’s National Address on a Partial Military Mobilization.” Washington Post, 21 Sept. 2022, www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/21/putin-speech-russia-ukraine-war-mobilization/. Accessed 25 Oct. 2022.
Yeung, Josh Pennington, Jessie. “Protests Erupt in Russia’s Dagestan Region as Minorities Say They Are Being Targeted by Putin’s Mobilization Orders.” CNN, 26 Sept. 2022, edition.cnn.com/2022/09/26/europe/russia-dagestan-protests-mobilization-intl-hnk/index.html. Accessed 25 Oct. 2022.
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